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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-SECOND COLLISION-ENHANCED INJURIES-
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES-The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has held that when a driver of an automobile
is injured by a "second collision" with a defectively designed auto-
mobile headrest caused by a collision with another car whose driver
was negligent, the plaintiff has the burden of showing how the
damages should be apportioned between the manufacturer of the
headrest and the negligent driver.
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
On March 24, 1970, Dr. Benjamin Huddell was driving his car,
manufactured by defendant General Motors Corporation (GM),
across the Delaware Memorial Bridge between New Jersey and Del-
aware. Before he got across the bridge, his car ran out of gasoline,
came to a stop,' and defendant George Levin's2 car crashed into its
rear.3 Huddell died from brain injuries caused when the force of the
collision threw his head against his car's headrest.'
In an action for wrongful death,5 Mrs. Huddell alleged that GM
was strictly liable for defectively designing the headrest,' and that
1. Huddell remained in his seat with the safety belt fastened, turned on the hazard
warning lights, and placed the car in park. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 732 (3d Cir. 1976).
2. Levin was acting in the course of his employment for S. Klein Department Stores, Inc.
(Klein), also a defendant in the case. Id. at 732.
3. Levin's speed was estimated at 50 miles per hour by his expert witness, 60 miles per
hour by the plaintiff's expert, and 68.5 miles per hour by GM's expert. The impact of the
collision caused Huddell's stationary automobile to accelerate to a speed of 31.7 miles per
hour. Id. The force of the collision so crushed the car that the rear passenger seat was pushed
nearly to the back of the front seat. The entire rear passenger compartment was crushed, and
Huddell's car was compacted to nearly five feet less than its original length. Brief for Appel-
lant General Motors Corp. at 9, 10, Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
4. An autopsy performed within two and one-half hours of Huddell's death revealed
"extensive fracture" to the occipital (rear) region of the decedent's skull. This fracture re-
sulted from the impact with the headrest. The frontal region of Dr. Huddell's brain was also
extensively damaged from a medical phenomenon known as "contrecoup," by which the brain
of a moving head striking a stationary object sustains injury opposite the point of the impact.
Huddell otherwise sustained only superficial injuries, there being no damage whatsoever to
the neck, skeletal or internal organs. 537 F.2d at 732.
5. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. See Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp.
64 (D.N.J. 1975).
6. The plaintiff contended the headrest consisted of "a sharp edge of unyielding metal"
covered with soft foam, and was defectively designed. She asserted that in anything but a
minor impact, the foam would collapse, exposing the head to the "ax-like" metal plate, and
concentrating the force of the impact on one small portion of the skull. The plaintiff's expert
witness gave uncontradicted testimony that the accident would have been survivable had the
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Levin was liable for driving negligently.7 The jury found that the
headrest was defectively designed and entered a judgment against
GM. In answer to special interrogatories, the jury found that Levin
was negligent, but that his conduct was not a proximate cause of
death.' The district court entered judgment against Levin' notwith-
standing the verdict. 0 All defendants appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit.
Judge Aldisert, writing for the court and applying New Jersey
law, vacated the judgments entered by the district court and or-
dered a new trial." He interpreted the state's law 2 to require, in an
orthodox products liability case, proof of a defective product causing
injury.'3 In a second collision case alleging defective design by an
automobile manufacturer, however, the court interpreted New Jer-
sey law to require the plaintiff to apportion the damages between
the two defendants by proving for which portion of the damages
each was responsible. In order to do this, the court stated, the plain-
restraint been designed and built with a larger surface so as to spread the focus of the impact
over a larger area of the skull. Brief for Appellee at 6, 8, 9, Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726
(3d Cir. 1976).
GM based its defense at trial on testimony which allegedly proved that Huddell's head
never hit the restraint. It noted that three of the plaintiff's experts testified that approxi-
mately 1,500 pounds of force per square inch would have been required to cause the skull
fracture. GM's expert testified that tests he performed revealed that only 180-230 pounds of
force per square inch would deform the front interior metal of the head restraint. Since the
restraint was not deformed, GM concluded that Huddell's head did not hit the restraint but
the metal above the crushed vehicle's rear window which contained a depression similar to
that caused by a human dummy skull in tests GM performed. The court expressed
"uneasiness" about the jury's finding that Huddell's head hit the restraint, but found there
was enough evidence to support the jury's decision. 537 F.2d at 736.
7. Levin's employer, Klein, was also joined as a defendant on the theory of respondeat
superior. 395 F. Supp. at 69.
8. Id.
9. The jury had also found in favor of Klein. The court of appeals cited the jury's findings
in favor of Klein and Levin, yet against GM, as the result of confusing and incorrect jury
instructions. This was one of the reasons for reversal. 537 F.2d at 739-41.
10. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was also ordered against Klein. The circuit
court observed that it was implicit in the district court's judgment notwithstanding the
verdict that the jury, once having found Levin negligent, could not properly conclude that
his acts were not a proximate cause of Huddell's death. 537 F.2d at 741.
11. Id. at 744.
12. Judge Aldisert noted that the court was required to apply New Jersey law, but was
"without the specific guidance of viable New Jersey precedents. This appeal requires us to
predict how the New Jersey Supreme Court would react when presented with novel and
difficult questions of tort law." Id. at 733.
13. Id. at 737.
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tiff must show: (1) there existed an alternative design that was
safer, yet practical; (2) what enhanced injuries would have occurred
had this safer design been used; and (3) a method of establishing
the extent of these enhanced injuries." The plaintiff in this case had
not met the last two requirements-she failed to show both the
existence and extent of enhanced injuries. 5
It was apparent the court had reservations about applying this
three-step rule; Judge Aldisert expressed the belief that the second
collision theory of liability required fresh legal thinking." He men-
tioned that upon retrial, the district court may request the parties
to consider whether the New Jersey Supreme Court would be recep-
tive to an apportionment rule similar to the one adopted by New
York courts. 7 The rule states that where a third party is found to
have been responsible for a part, but not all, of the damages for
which the primary defendant is held liable, the primary defendant
may recover that portion of the damages from the third party. This
requires an apportionment of responsibility. It is a question of fact
which may be adjudicated in a separate action, or as a separate
issue by joining the third party as defendant. 8 Judge Aldisert rea-
soned that as applied to the second collision cases, 9 the rule would
14. Id. at 737-38.
15. The court stated:
Without proof to establish what injuries would have resulted from a non-defective
head restraint, the plaintiff could not and did not establish what injuries resulted from
the alleged defect in the head restraint. Without such proof, the jury could not have
properly have [sic] assessed responsibility against G.M. for the death of Dr. Huddell.
Id. at 738.
16. Id. at 742.
17. See notes 18-20 infra. Even if the parties agreed the New Jersey Supreme Court would
be receptive to the New York rule, it is not certain the federal court would have -the power to
declare it applicable. Judge Aldisert, bothered by the "constraints" placed on the federal
system, noted that he was placed in the position of having to make a prediction of state law
without guidance from state precedents. 537 F.2d at 733. See note 12 supra.
18. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972),
in which plaintiffs decedent, following orders from his employer, entered a grain elevator
which had been recently fumagated with Dow's highly poisonous gas. Plaintiff's suit was
based on the negligently insufficient warnings given by Dow. Dow, in turn, sought to-join the
plaintiff's employer. Dow alleged that the employer had received sufficient warnings from
Dow, but did not follow them. Both Dow and the employer were found liable and the court
invoked the "apportionment according to responsibility" rule. See also Kelly v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972) (applying the rule to
cross-claims among co-defendants).
19. The New York rule has only been applied to cases involving the common law distinc-
tion between active and passive negligence and not second collision cases. Without explaining
why, Judge Aldisert stated that the second collision area was sui generis. 537 F.2d at 742.
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require the defendants to apportion the damages, thus lessening the
plaintiff's burden of demonstrating which injuries would have been
suffered had a properly designed headrest been installed. 0
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn argued that the burden of
apportioning damages should shift to the defendants once the plain-
tiff has proved a prima facie case against both. In reaching this
conclusion, he looked beyond New Jersey law to general tort law
regarding joint tort-feasors,21 concurrent tort-feasors, 2 and multiple
automobile collisions,2 3 and ascertained a rationale that defendants
should not escape liability because the innocent plaintiff cannot
prove which defendant caused which portion of his injury. Analog-
izing this to a second collision situation,2 Judge Rosenn reasoned
20. Under the New York rule, the plaintiff's rights are not affected by the apportionment
process. The Huddell court apparently determined that since the primary defendant is poten-
tially liable for all of the plaintiff's injuries, it does not make sense to require the plaintiff to
prove the case against the other defendant. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.
21. Judge Rosenn quoted Judge Learned Hand in Navigazione Libera T.S.A. v. Newtown
Creek Towing Co., 98 F.2d 694, 697 (2d.Cir. 1938): "[T]he law imposes upon each tortfeasor
the impossible burden of proof, contenting itself with limiting the injured person's total
recovery to one indemnity. . . . Let [each tort-feasor] unravel the casuistries resulting from
his wrong." 537 F.2d at 744 (concurring opinion).
22. As illustrative of the law surrounding concurrent tort-feasors, Judge Rosenn cited
Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (plaintiff killed in fall for which
two defendants held liable, one for negligently helping to operate a hoist and the other for
violating safety regulations), and Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (plaintiff
hit by one of two defendants who shot in same direction). He also cited the Second Restate-
ment of Torts which states:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has
been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which
one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tors § 433B(3) (1965).
23. As illustrative of the law in this area, Judge Rosenn cited Hill v. Macomber, 103 N.J.
Super. 127, 246 A.2d 731 (1968) (plaintiffs car hit twice in rapid succession, producing
indivisible injuries).
24. Judge Rosenn stated that New Jersey courts have adopted this rationale. As an exam-
ple of how far courts are willing to protect the innocent plaintiff, he cited Anderson v.
Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975) (plaintiff injured while being operated on due to
negligence of either hospital staff, defect in instrument, or some other unknown cause; burden
shifted to defendants to prove who is not the wrongdoer). Judge Rosenn believed the reason
for the rule was to protect the plaintiff, since without the rule, if he failed in his burden
against any one defendant, it would free both from liability. 537 F.2d at 744.
Judge Aldisert disagreed with this assumption, and the two judges' disagreement over this
point was a major reason for the difference in their analyses. See note 45 and accompanying
text supra.
25. Judge Rosenn noted that several courts and commentators have supported the idea
that the plaintiff's burden of. apportionment should be relaxed in cases involving multiple
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that once the plaintiff has shown a defect had caused an "otherwise
survivable accident" to be fatal, the burden of apportionment
should shift to the defendants. 6 Since' the plaintiff in Huddell intro-
duced uncontroverted expert testimony that the accident would
have been survivable but for the defective headrest, the burden of
apportionment should have been shifted to the defendants."
Second collision automobile injuries are those that occur when as
the result of the force of a collision of one car With another, a passen-
ger is thrown against some part of the inside of his car, sustaining
injury. It has only been since 1960 that courts have begun to hold
manufacturers of defectively designed products28 liable for these sec-
ond collision injuries29 and much controversy still exists.9 Some
wrongdoers, including second collision cases. See e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d
173 (1st Cir. 1974); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Kelly v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334"N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972); Dole v.
Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972); Ausubel, The
Impact of New York's Judicially Created Loss Apportionment'Amongst Tortfeasors, 38 ALB.
L. REv. 155 (1974); Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the'-Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L.
REv. 645 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Nader & Page]; Sklaw, "Second Collision" Liability:
The Need for Uniformity, 4 SETON HALL L. REv. 499 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sklaw].
26. "Otherwise survivable accident" means the plaintiff must prove that the collision
would have been survivable if the part of the car 'defectively designed had been designed
correctly. This requires proof of an alternative design that is safer and practical. See 537 F.2d
at 747 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. Presumably, the manufacturer has the "deeper pocket" and is therefore a more desira-
ble defendant than the negligent driver. In Huddell, Levin was acting in the scope of his
employment for Klein, once a successful chain store operation. Klein, however, a subsidiary
of McCrory Corporation, was in deep financial trouble at the time of trial.
29. See e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). See generally
Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560, 564 n.6 (1972).
30. The seminal case holding the manufacturer liable for second collision injuries is Lar-
sen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). There, the plaintiff alleged negli-
gence on the part of the defendant manufacturer in designing a steering column extending
2.7 inches beyond the frontmost point of the front tires. As a result of this design, in a severe
head-on collision the entire steering mechanism was thrust backwards into the plaintiff-
driver, injuring him. The plaintiff contended that the injuries would not have occurred had
the car been properly designed. The district court granted summary judgment for the manu-
facturer. The court of appeals reversed:
We think the "intended use" construction urged by General Motors is much too
narrow and unrealistic. Where the manufacturer's negligence in design causes an un-
reasonable risk to be imposed upon the user of its products, the manufacturer should
be liable for the injury caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care in the design.
These injuries are readily foreseeable as an incident to the normal and expected use
of an automobile. While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with
each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result
in collisions and injury-producing impacts. . . .The sole function of an automobile is
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courts, focusing on causation, are reluctant to hold the manufac-
turer liable, reasoning that the defect involved in the "second colli-
sion" did not cause the accident.' Others have reasoned that the
manufacturer is not under a duty to build a crash-proof vehicle, 3
or that collisions are not an intended use of the car and therefore
the defendant manufacturer cannot be held liable. 33
Following the Eighth Circuit's decision in Larsen v. General Mo-
tors Corp.,34 some courts have held the manufacturer liable, 35 rea-
not just to provide a safe means of transportation, it is to provide a means of safe
transportation or as safe as is reasonably possible under the present state of the art.
Id. at 502. See. also Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974) (normal use of a
pick-up truck broad enough to include 30 mile per hour collision, and manufacturer not free
from liability as a matter of law); Turcotte v. Ford-Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974)
(defendant manufacturer liable for injuries caused by gas tank design allowing for an unrea-
sonable risk of explosion in a rear-end collision); Anton v. Ford Motor Co., 400 F. Supp. 1270
(S.D. Ohio 1975) (manufacturer liable for defectively designed gasoline tank and rear bumper
allowing tank to rupture upon collision).
A case often cited in support of the nonliability of the manufacturer in second collision
cases is Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966). In Evans, the defendant manufacturer designed its 1961 Chevrolet station wagons
with an "X" frame. While driving this model car through an intersection, plaintiff's decedent
was hit broadside in the driver's door by another vehicle. The car collapsed inward, killing
the driver. The plaintiff theorized that the design of the frame was negligent because it would
not sustain a collision of this type, even though the result was foreseeable to the manufac-
turer. The court did not agree, stating "a manufacturer is not under a duty to make his
automobile accident-proof or fool-proof. . . .The intended purpose of an automobile does
not include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's abil-
ity to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur." Id. at 824-25. See also Yetter v.
Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973) (manufacturer had no duty to design nonrigid or
collapsible steering column for the purpose of reducing injuries in a head-on collision in which
decedent was thrust against the steering wheel); Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346
F. Supp. 320 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (manufacturer not liable for design of gasoline tank cap that
would fly off, nor for gasoline tank that would crush upon collision); Shumard v. General
*Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (no duty to design automobile that would
be fireproof upon collision and explosion); Hoenig & Geotz, A Rational Approach to
"Crashworthy" Automobiles: The Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. REv. 1 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Hoenig & Geotz]; Hoenig & Werber, Automobile "Crashworthiness":
an Untenable Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 578 (1971).
31. E.g., Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568, 572 (Miss. 1969) (plaintiff
injured when, in a rear-end collision, seat back broke and fell backwards, causing plaintiff to
fall to prone position and be thrust into steering wheel).
32. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 836 (1966).
33. Id. at 825.
34. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
35. Many commentators have expressed the belief that Larsen will begin a trend in this
area. For example, Dean Prosser has stated:
The current lively controversy . ..is over whether the maker is under a duty to
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soning that the collision, although not an intended use, is nonethe-
less foreseeable and something the manufacturer has a duty to rea-
sonably guard against. 6 Once it is established in a jurisdiction that
the manufacturer may be held liable in these circumstances, 7 it is
generally accepted that the manufacturer is liable only for the en-
hanced injuries resulting from the second collision." Liability
extends only to those injuries for which the manufacturer was
strictly liable because of its defectively designed and unreasonably
dangerous product. If the plaintiff proves that the driver of the
other car was negligent and that the manufacturer was strictly
liable, it must then be determined for what part of the total injuries
each tort-feasor was responsible. Three possible methods for such
apportionment emerge from the majority and concurring opinions
in HuddeUl.
The first approach, adopted by the majority, places the burden
of apportionment, entirely on the plaintiff. In order to prove the
manufacturer liable, the plaintiff must show a defect, an alternative
design that is safer yet practical, and, most importantly, what inju-
ries would have occurred had this alternative design been used. 3
make the car "crashworthy," or in other words, to prevent injury from what has been
called the "second collision," when the plaintiff comes into contact with some part of
the automobile after the crash. The greater number of decisions have denied any duty
to protect against the consequences of collisions, on the rather specious ground that
collision is not the intended use of the car, but is an abnormal use which relieves the
maker of responsibility. It is, however, clearly a foreseeable danger arising out of the
intended use; and it cannot be expected . . . to hold. In a small number of late
decisions, the duty has been recognized, and the driver or passenger has been allowed
to recover.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Toms § 96, at 646 (4th ed. 1971). Since this writing,
the cases demonstrate that Dean Prosser's view was apparently correct; the Larsen approach
now appears to have become the majority position. See Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64
(D.N.J. 1975); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LAHiLrry § 1:31 (2d ed.
1974); Sklaw, supra note 25.
36. See 391 F.2d at 503.
37. Where strict liability in tort has been adopted by the jurisdiction, it is generally the
best theory upon which to bring the case. See Sklaw, supra note 25, at 517, 519-20 (tracing
the transition from negligence to strict liability). See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560
(1972).
38. As the Larsen court observed:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the manufacturer to
liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer should be liable for that portion
of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or
injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent
the defective design.
391 F.2d at 503. See also Nader & Page, supra note 25, at 658; 118 U. PA. L. Rlv. 299, 303
(1969).
39. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. In Huddell, the plaintiffs alternative
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This rule finds support in the court's reading of the Federal District
Court for the District of New Jersey's decision in Yetter v. Rajeski,'0
where, "enhanced injuries" were defined as those injuries that did
occur over those that would have occurred had the plaintiff's alter-
native design been used in place of the defective design causing the
injury.4 Applying this interpretation of New Jersey law in Huddell,
Judge Aldisert read it to require the three-step apportionment for-
mula.
The second theory, the New York rule,4" shifts the burden of ap-
portionment to the defendants once .both are proven to be wrong-
doers. Although Judge Aldisert implied that this rule could be used
in Huddell, he did not say how it would apply, nor what effect, if
any, it would have on the case. He did not say what burden of proof
must be met for manufacturer liability. Presumably, the burden
would be the same as under the Huddell majority's approach, since
there is no apparent reason why the requirement of proof should be
lighter simply because it rests on a co-defendant rather than a plain-
tiff. But under this rule, the primary defendant, rather than the
plaintiff, would have to satisfy the three-step apportionment test.
A third formulation, espoused by Judge Rosenn, would shift the
burden from the plaintiff once he proves both defendants are wrong-
doers and the accident would have been survivable but for the man-
ufacturer's defective design . 3 Most importantly, it would remove
the requirement that the plaintiff or either defendant prove what
injuries would have resulted from the use of the alternative design.
This theory employs a definition of "enhanced injuries" differing
from that used in the majority and New York theories. Enhanced
injuries are those that did occur over those that resulted from the
design broadened the headrest's area of impact on the metal brace. Brief for Appellee at 6,
8, 9, Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). If, using this alternative, it could be proven
that serious brain injury or death would have resulted, the plaintiffs recovery against General
Motors would have been little or nothing.
40. 364 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.J. 1973).
41. In Yetter, the court stated: "[Wlhen we are dealing with a claim for enhanced
injuries, it is absolutely necessary that the jury be presented with some evidence as to the
extent of injuries, if any, which would have been suffered by [the plaintiff] had the plaintiffs
hypothetical design been installed...." Id. at 109.
42. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
43. See note 26 supra. Judge Rosenn distinguished Yetter since there the plaintiff had
failed to prove the accident was survivable absent the defect. Also, the plaintiff had settled
with the primary defendant, who was no longer a party to the action. 537 F.2d at 747.
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first collision alone," without considering what effect the alternative
design would have had.
The crux of the difference between the majority and New York
approaches on the one hand, and the Rosenn approach on the other,
is the potential liability of the defendants. In the first two, the
negligent driver is potentially liable for the whole of the injuries,' 5
while the manufacturer is potentially liable only for the enhanced
injuries arising from the second collision. The plaintiff is limited to
a single recovery. This necessarily implies that the manufacturer
and primary defendant are not potentially liable for the same or
equal parts of the plaintiff's injuries since at most, the manufacturer
could be held liable only for the enhanced injuries. The negligent
driver, in contrast, is potentially liable for all the injuries, unless the
plaintiff under the majority approach, or primary defendant under
the New York rule, meets the difficult burden of apportioning the
damages. If that burden is met, the primary defendant is freed of
responsibility only for the enhanced injuries attributable to the sec-
ond collision."6 Because of the differing degrees of potential liability,
these theories require that the three-step apportionment formula be
met before the manufacturer can be held liable.
A possible shortcoming of the majority approach lies in the specu-
lative nature of the plaintiff's claim to damages; it is a well-settled
rule that for damages to be recoverable, they cannot be specula-
tive.47 Yet the plaintiff under the majority formula is forced to de-
vise some method of proving what injuries would have occurred had
an alternative, safer design been used. Although such a method is
44. This definition is consistent with the one given by the Larsen court. See note 38 supra.
The Larsen court defined enhanced injuries as those injuries caused by the defective design
over those that would have occurred as a result of the collision absent the defective design.
391 F.2d at 503. This does not require a showing of what injuries would have occurred had
the alternative design been used. Some writers, however, have read Larsen to require such a
finding. See Hoenig & Geotz, supra note 30, at 43-44.
45. See 537 F.2d at 738-39. Judge Rosenn, concurring, said: "A failure in apportionment
must then needs excuse both wrongdoers." Id. at 744. Judge Aldisert answered this argument
by stating: "[Tihe burden of apportionment applies only to plaintiff's claim against General
Motors. Should plaintiff fail to meet her burden on this claim, the brute fact is that the
negligent driver would not escape liability on the same ground." Id. at 739.
46. One result of this plan may be that, in a case involving a proven negligent driver with
limited financial resources, the plaintiff and primary defendant will find themselves allied
in trying to prove large enhanced damages caused by the manufacturer's defect.
47. Fleming, Damages in Accident Cases, in DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL
DEATH CASES 22-25 (S. Schreiber ed. 1965).
1977
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grounded almost entirely upon speculation, to recover from the
manufacturer the plaintiff must persuade the trial judge that his
proof amounts to more than mere conjecture, and convince the jury
that the suggested alternative injuries would have been sustained."
In the larger number of cases where this cannot be done, the effect
will be to insulate from liability the manufacturer and restrict any
recovery to the negligent driver.
The Rosenn approach, in contrast, sees the primary defendant
and the manufacturer each potentially liable only for his own part
of the injuries. 9 The primary defendant is potentially liable only for
the injuries resulting from the first collision, and the manufacturer
only for those resulting from the second collision with the defec-
tively designed part of the car; neither is potentially liable for the
whole.50 Because of this equality, the plaintiff need only make out
a prima facie case against both in order to have the burden shift to
the defendants to prove what portion of the total damages was at-
tributable to the part of the collision for which he is responsible.'
The Rosenn approach, however, is not without its difficulties. For
48. See Hoenig & Geotz, supra note 30, discussing the difficulty of meeting this burden
of proof. The authors argue:
Under Larsen, the plaintiffs experts must prove beyond speculation and conjecture
what portion of damage or injury was caused by the negligent design, "over and above"
the damage or injury that probably would have occurred in the collision, absent the
defective design.
Intricate factual and medical hair-splitting of this nature quite obviously contem-
plates expert testimony of a specialized, medical nature and qualified technical experts
of the highest caliber. Otherwise, a jury would have absolutely no reasonable basis for
determining the injury caused by the negligent design "over and above" what would
normally have resulted, and a court applying such a test would have to safeguard
scrupulously against a descent into speculation and conjecture. This poses a vast
challenge to judicial responsibility. The court would have to screen carefully the per-
missible evidence, in order that the jury receive the appropriate testimony with suita-
ble guidelines. It would also have to weigh the effect of other relevent considerations
which are implicit in the design of each vehicle, such as cost, weight, size, function,
maneuverability and a host of other considerations. Assuming that such a role could
be effectively discharged, it does not seem likely that any expert could supply all the
answers with a reasonable degree of professional certainty.
Id. at 43-44.
49. See 537 F.2d at 744-45 (concurring opinion).
50. This theory justifies Judge Rosenn's comment that if the apportionment burden was
on the plaintiff and he failed to meet it, the failure would excuse both wrongdoers. See id. at
744.
51. Because the defendants have equal degrees of potential liability does not mean that
either party could not completely exculpate itself from liability. For the burden of proof to
shift, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case against both defendants. Should the
plaintiff fail to do so against either party, there is no apportionment question.
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example, in most collisions little or no substantial harm is done by
the first collision alone. Injury occurs when, because of the force
resulting from the first collision, the passenger is thrust against
some part of the inside of his car.2 Thus, although under this ap-
proach it is theoretically liable only for a certain part of the injuries,
the manufacturer, in reality, stands to be held liable for most or all
of the damages."
A possible middle ground was overlooked by the Huddell court.
The court could have accepted the proposition that a negligent
driver is potentially liable for the whole of the injuries, leaving the
burden of proof and the requirement of showing an alternative de-
sign on the plaintiff. The court would then remove the onerous
requirement that the plaintiff prove what injuries would have been
caused had the safer, alternative design been used, but would allow
the manufacturer to do so to rebut the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff
would only have to show what portion of the total damages were
attributable to the defective design, and what portion could be
traced to the first collision. The manufacturer could mitigate his
damages by showing the inadequacy of the plaintiff's alternative
52. See Hoenig & Geotz, supra note 30, at 44-51.
53. It is not inconsistent for one party to be liable for all the damages when the parties
have equal degrees of potential liability. For example, if the jury found that the first collision
caused no injury to the plaintiff, but that in a second collision with a defectively designed
steering column the plaintiff was seriously injured, the manufacturer would be liable for all
of the damages since the injury resulted from the only part of the collision for which the
manufacturer was responsible. Of course the manufacturer will only be liable when it is
proven, at the least, that it designed a defective product. In the absense of such proof, the
manufacturer cannot be held liable, and presumably, the plaintiff would then be able to
recover all damages from the driver under traditional negligence law.
A more enticing non-apportionment problem not addressed by the Huddell court is the case
where the driver of a car causing an accident is found not negligent, but the manufacturer is
found strictly liable. No apportionment question exists, but the question becomes for what
damages, if any, can the manufacturer be held. This raises the problem of whether strict
liability law could be expanded to cover the case of an injury-causing defect that comes into
play only as the result of an accident that the defect had no part in causing. If so, proximate
cause limitations might relieve the manufacturer from liability for those injuries caused by
the first collision, but the manufacturer may be liable for the enhanced injuries caused by
the second collision.
Another problem is whether this situation is also present with the differing degrees of
liability theory of the majority. Assuming the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying the strict liabil-
ity requirements needed to hold the manufacturer liable, but fails to prove the driver negli-
gent, can the manufacturer be held liable for the enhanced injuries? Arguably it could be,
since the potential liability of the manufacturer, though less than that of the driver of the
other car, is not dependent on a finding of negligence on that driver's part; the question would
be decided by standard principles of strict product liability law.
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design by proving what injuries would have been caused had the
plaintiff's alternative design been used.5" The underlying rationale
is a combination of the definition of enhanced injuries used in the
Rosenn approach, that is, those injuries that did occur, over those
caused by the first collision alone, and the differing degrees of po-
tential liability of the defendants used in the Aldisert and New York
methods.
This compromise formulation, borrowing aspects from both the
majority and concurring opinions, resolves several problems which
inhere in both those views. Once the jurisdiction has decided a
manufacturer can be held liable, it is contradictory to then place on
the plaintiff a burden of proof that will probably exonerate the
manufacturer. The compromise approach makes it easier for the
plaintiff to prove the injuries attributable to the manufacturer's
defectively designed product, while allowing total recovery from the
negligent driver should the plaintiff fail to do so. One criticism of
the Rosenn approach-that by the nature of automobile accidents
most damages will result from the second collision-is still applica-
ble here.5 5 This approach would nonetheless be more equitable to
the manufacturer than the concurring judge's theory, since the
manufacturer will be able to disprove all or part of the damages by
showing the inadequacy of the plaintiff's alternative design.
Shortly after the Third Circuit's decision in Huddell, the author
of the majority opinion remarked that conceptually, the case was
one of the most difficult with which he had ever dealt.56 Serious
policy decisions must be resolved before a consistent pattern of
54. Proving the injuries that would have occurred had the plaintiff's alternative design
been used is a very difficult burden of proof. See note 48 supra. Here, however, the proof is
being offered to rebut the plaintiff's case by showing that his proposed design may not be as
safe as suggested. Thus, the defendant will not be using it as a method of satisfying a required
burden of proof, but as a means of questioning the alternative design of the plaintiff, who
has the burden of establishing the existence of such a design.
The advantage of this procedure is to remove the possibility of holding the manufacturer
liable for most or all of the damages when the only safer alternative that could have been
used would have resulted in injuries only slightly less serious than those caused by the
defective design. In addition, since the procedure is used to rebut the plaintiff's case, the
degree of proof needed to convince the judge and jury might not be as strong as where a
plaintiff has the affirmative duty to so prove. Finally, it may be more sensible to place on
the manufacturer the responsibility for proving what injuries would have occurred using the
alternative design, since the manufacturer has the needed experts and testing facilities.
55. See notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text supra.




decisional law can be developed in this area. One such question is
whether a defendant who had no part in causing the original acci-
dent should be put on equal footing with one who did. On the other
hand, a defendant against whom a prima facie case of strict prod-
ucts liability has been made arguably should not be allowed to
escape liability simply because a plaintiff (or co-defendant) is un-
able to properly apportion damages due to the nature of the acci-
dent.
The two opinions in Huddell, as well as the New York rule, pres-
ent three ways of solving these difficult problems. Which of these
theories will be adopted by the courts, if any, may ultimately de-
pend on the particular jurisdiction faced with the issue. Many states
still do not hold the manufacturer of defectively designed products
liable for second collision injuries.57 Disagreement is certainly likely
among those that do as to how the damages should be apportioned.
As the Huddell opinions demonstrate, the second collision/
enhanced injury problem is one which promises to engender con-
sidered, and hopefully innovative, judicial thought in a difficult
area of law.
Carl Harvison
57. See note 30 supra.
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